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Abstract 
Long-term contracts for electricity can counter market power and reduce prices 
in short-term markets.  If electricity retailers face competition, however, 
companies signing long-term contracts are exposed to the risk that a fall in 
short-term prices would allow rivals to buy on the spot market and undercut 
them.  Could this lead to less contracting and higher prices?  This paper 
estimates the size of this effect, combining models of electricity retailing and of 
competition in the wholesale markets.  Given enough volatility and an 
otherwise competitive long-term market, retail competition might raise 
wholesale prices by up to nineteen per cent.  
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1. Introduction 
In many countries, the focus of electricity restructuring has moved on from creating 
competition in generation, to creating competitive retail markets for electricity.  Norway 
allowed all its consumers to choose an electricity retailer in 1993, and progressively 
removed any barriers that prevented small consumers from exercising this choice.  Sweden 
and Finland followed suit a few years later.  In Great Britain, where large customers had 
been allowed to choose their supplier since 1990, all consumers were  
given a choice from 1999.  In the United States, electricity restructuring at the wholesale 
level has frequently been accompanied by retail choice programmes, some more successful 
than others.  In Germany, all consumers were allowed to choose their supplier from 1999, 
while there has arguably been little change in the operation of the generation sector.  In 
some markets, few consumers have exercised this choice, but in the UK, more than one 
third of domestic electricity consumers, and a significant majority of industrial customers, 
have moved away from their local retailer.  
Does this change have any implications for the operation of electricity wholesale 
markets?  Supporters of retail competition, such as Littlechild (2003), argue that it will 
force retailers to be more careful in their purchasing decisions, and this active demand side 
will make the wholesale markets more competitive.  Newbery (2002), however, has argued 
that the increase in competition at the retail level will make buyers in the wholesale market 
reluctant to sign long-term contracts with generators, fearing adverse movements in the 
price of electricity.  If retailing is a regulated monopoly, the retailer may face some kind of 
prudential review, but can otherwise expect to be allowed to pass on the actual cost of its 
electricity purchases, even if these turn out to be more expensive than current wholesale 
prices. 
 In a competitive supply market, however, a company will not be able to pass its 
actual costs on to its consumers, but may only charge what the market will bear.  This will 
depend upon the current level of wholesale prices, at which its rivals can purchase marginal 
supplies.  If the wholesale price has fallen below the level expected when the company 
committed itself to purchases under long-term contracts, then the company may have to sell 
for less than the cost of those contracts.   
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This is naturally an unattractive prospect.  Can companies avoid this risk?  The 
obvious course is to minimise the number of long-term contracts bought by the company. 
If, as in the UK, retail prices are typically set for a year at a time (there is an annual contract 
round” concentrated in January and February), the company should buy most of its 
electricity in annual contracts.  If the company bought multi-year contracts, wholesale 
prices might fall, making it impossible to recover the excess cost, while if the company 
bought a series of shorter contracts, there is a risk that wholesale prices might rise before 
retail prices could be adjusted.  (The Californian debacle was an example of this kind of  
problem – retail prices had been fixed for four years, while wholesale prices varied day by 
day, and the companies had not hedged their purchases.)  
What are the implications of this kind of purchasing strategy?  The company’s 
prices will be more volatile, the shorter the average length of its contracts, but this may not 
be a major concern to most of its customers, if electricity represents a small proportion of 
their budgets.  Much more important is the impact on the wholesale market, however. A 
number of authors (Powell, 1993; Newbery, 1998; Green, 1999; Wolak, 2000) have shown 
that long-term contracts can reduce wholesale electricity prices in the presence of market 
power.  Powell, Green and Wolak concentrated on the static impact of contracts on 
companies’ bidding strategies, given the present structure of the market.   
Newbery also considered the impact upon the market’s structure – sufficiently long-
term contracts effectively make entry contestable.  An entrant can simultaneously lock in its 
fuel purchases and electricity sales, removing price risk, and the sunk costs of bringing a 
project to the point where contracts can be signed are relatively low.  If there are buyers 
willing to sign contacts for the expected life of the plant (or at least until it has paid back its 
capital costs), then the cost of output from a new entrant effectively caps the price that 
incumbents can charge for similar contracts.  This does not make the market for all kinds of 
contracts perfectly contestable, of course, for new entrants will place little pressure on the 
price of short-term contracts, which do not last long enough for them to recover their 
capital costs.  Nevertheless, the incumbents must be aware that high short-term prices will 
encourage entry, and may well practice a form of limit pricing.  If retailers are reluctant to 
sign contracts, however, new entrant generators will face much greater price risk, raising 
the entry price. 
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Both static and dynamic arguments imply that a high degree of long-term 
contracting in the electricity wholesale market is likely to reduce prices.  If the trend 
towards retail competition reduces the demand for contracts, wholesale prices are likely to 
rise.  This would be undesirable, but we do not yet know if the effect would be important – 
how much might prices rise?   This paper aims to quantify this effect with a formal model 
that can be used to produce numerical solutions.   
In the next section, we outline the broad structure of our model, which is adapted 
from Powell (1993).  The succeeding sections analyse the decisions made by generators,  
by regulated retailers, and by retailers facing competition.  Section 6 gives some numerical 
solutions, to show the quantitative impact of these issues.  Brief conclusions are given in 
section 7. 
 
 
2. The model 
We will model two strategic generators and a number of incumbent regional retailers.  They 
meet in two wholesale markets, in which the generators set quantities.  One is for long-term 
contracts, which might need to last for ten or fifteen years if they are to help finance a new 
power station.  The second market is for sales of a much shorter duration.  The literature 
typically calls this second market the “spot” market, but in the UK, a high proportion of 
electricity is sold under annual contracts.  Most large retail customers are also supplied 
under annual contracts, and so a retailer who signs an annual contract to buy power at the 
same time has hedged most of the price risk it faces.  We will therefore refer to the second 
market as the “annual” market, and ignore inter-year variations in prices and quantities.1  
The long-term contracts could be financial, hedging the annual price, or for physical 
delivery – the two types are equivalent for our purposes.  The strategic generators may also 
face a price-taking competitive fringe – their output would be subtracted from the gross 
consumer demand to give the net demand for the duopolists. 
We assume that the strategic generators set quantities in the annual market, 
following Powell (1993).  In earlier work (Green, 1999) I used a supply function model for 
                                                          
1 As long as the retailers have hedged the bulk of their expected sales with one-year contracts, and the 
generators have hedged their fuel costs, they face relatively low risks over the course of a single year.  
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the spot market.  In many ways, this is a better depiction of competition in the electricity 
industry, but it suffers from a multiplicity of equilibria.  A linear supply function model has 
a unique equilibrium, but is a special case in so far as it turns out that neither generator 
would wish to sell long-term contracts, given Cournot competition (a zero conjectural 
variation) in that market.  Using Cournot competition in the annual market provides a 
unique equilibrium, and one in which the impact of each contract sold on the wholesale 
price is greater than in the supply function model (although this raises the danger of over-
estimating their importance).  
In the long-term market, we use a model based on quantity-setting, but with each 
firm having a conjectural variation about its rival’s response to changes in its quantity.  
Powell (1993) assumed price setting in the contract market, and found that prices would 
equal marginal cost unless the generators colluded.  The conjectural variations model 
encompasses the two polar cases of price and quantity setting.  It can be viewed as 
equivalent to a supply function model in terms of its equilibria – each firm could be 
offering a supply function passing through the equilibrium price and quantity, with its 
conjectural variation giving the slope of the rival’s supply function.       
We assume that each of the retailers in our model is a regional incumbent with a 
relatively small share of the national market, taking prices in that market as given.2  This 
means that we can model them as non-strategic participants in the wholesale markets.  
Powell (1993) models a small number of retailers, and they have a strategic motive for 
contracting, knowing that this will affect the wholesale price.  We will not model final 
electricity consumers, but Green (2001) presents a detailed model that justifies the demand 
side presented here for small consumers.   
We will model the retailers under two regulatory regimes.  In the first regime, 
typical of Great Britain until 1998, and of most other countries around the world, the 
incumbents are regulated monopolies.  In many countries, such a firm would be allowed to 
pass the cost of electricity purchases through to final consumers.  This would give the 
incumbent little incentive to control its purchase costs, however.  We therefore model a 
slightly more sophisticated approach, yardstick regulation.  Each incumbent is allowed to 
charge a price equal to the average purchase cost in the rest of the industry.  For simplicity, 
                                                          
2 A larger retailer would have a strategic incentive to buy more contracts in order to depress wholesale prices. 
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we normalise the retailer’s own costs and profit margin to zero.  In the second regime, 
which has prevailed since 1990 for large customers in Great Britain, and was introduced for 
small consumers in 2002, there is competition and the incumbent retailers are allowed to 
charge any price that the market will bear.3  This does not necessarily imply that prices will 
be driven down to the level of marginal costs.  Most domestic consumers still buy their 
power from their local supplier, even though other companies are undercutting them by 5% 
(or more).  Green (2001) models this as due to switching costs, real or psychological.  
Giulietti et al (2000) take survey evidence on the savings that consumers would require to 
switch suppliers.  Both papers conclude that incumbents would maximise their profits with 
prices significantly above those charged by entrants. 
Our model has three stages.  In the first stage, electricity retailers and generators 
meet in the long-term contract market – generators set quantities, taking their conjectural 
variation of the rival’s response into account, and the level of demand determines the price.  
In the second stage, the price in the annual wholesale market is determined.  This depends 
upon stochastic factors – the level of demand by large consumers, and perhaps the level of 
entry – that are not resolved until after the long-term contracts have been signed.  In the 
third stage, retailers set their prices to consumers, and their profits are determined.  
Although our “long-term” contracts only last for a single period, this could be easily 
changed.  The key point is that the terms of the contract are agreed before it is possible to 
accurately forecast prices in the short-term market.  Much of the structure of the model is 
based on that of Powell (1993) – in particular, we assume that the total demand by small 
consumers is fixed, so that the regulated monopoly need only consider price risk.  
We have deliberately chosen to make the level of the strategic generators’ demand 
the unknown variable that is resolved at the start of the second stage.  Fuel prices might be 
seen as a more important source of uncertainty, but they have a symmetric effect on both 
incumbents and entrants.  Furthermore, it is possible to sign hedging contracts for fuel, or 
to link the wholesale price of a generator’s output to an index of fuel prices.  These 
techniques reduce the risk that an electricity retailer would be left holding contracts that 
were uncompetitive with current market prices.  While the model needs to be solved by 
                                                          
3 There are still some regulatory constraints on the incumbents’ prices at present, so the UK is not quite in this 
second regime yet, but the regulator is proposing to remove them. 
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backward induction, it is most convenient to start with the generators’ actions in the annual 
wholesale market, the second stage of the model. 
 
 
3. The generators 
The generators are identical, with constant marginal costs equal to c. Generator i sells an 
amount xi in the forward market, at a price of f.  We model their behaviour in this market 
after considering the annual wholesale market.  In that market, they face a downwards- 
sloping demand curve, p = A – b (qi + qj), where Q is the total quantity demanded, p is the 
price in the annual market, and A is the intercept of the demand curve, net of output from 
the competitive fringe (if any).  A is a stochastic variable, but its value is known by the time 
that the annual market opens.  Each generator aims to maximise its profits, given by the 
revenue from sales in the forward market (xi) and the annual market (qi – xi), less the cost of 
generation:  
(1) qc xfxqqqbA = iiiijii −+−+− )( ))((π   
We can differentiate equation (1) to get the generator’s reaction function: 
 
(2)    
b
bxbqcA
q iji 2
+−−=  
 
The other generator has a similar reaction function, and we can solve the pair to give us the 
generator’s output and the annual price as a function of each firm’s forward sales: 
 
(3)    
b
bxbxcA
q jii 3
2 −+−=  
(4)    
3
)( ji xxbcAcp
+−−+=  
 
Each firm’s output is increasing in its own forward sales and decreasing in its rival’s, while 
the annual market price is decreasing in each firm’s forward sales.  These results are now 
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standard (Allaz and Vila, 1993), as is the implication that if both firms signed contracts for 
(A – c)/2b, half of the output that the industry could sell at a price of c, then it would be 
optimal for them to produce this amount, driving the annual price down to marginal cost.   
 In the forward market, the generators have to choose the level of their forward sales 
before they know the value of A, and hence the out-turn price in the annual market.  We 
will see below that the forward price will not necessarily equal the expected annual  
price, and that the difference will depend on the level of forward sales.  The generators’ 
expected profits are given by: 
 
(5)  
b
Axpf
xxbcA
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e
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e
e
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Each generator wishes to maximise its expected profits by choosing the best level of 
contract sales, given its rival’s sales, and its conjectural variation as to how they will 
change in response to a change in its own sales: 
 
(6) 
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Denoting the conjectural variation, ∂xj/∂xi, by γ, this can be manipulated to give us a 
reaction function: 
 
(7)  
( )
i
e
e
j
e
i xpfb
pfbxcA
x ∂−∂+−+
−+−−−−=
/)()1(9)4(
)(9)21()21(
γγ
γγ
 
 
To make further progress, we need to know how the expected forward price premium 
varies with the number of contracts sold, and for that, we need to model the retailers. 
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4. A regulated incumbent retailer 
We assume that there are two classes of electricity consumers, large and small.  Even if the 
incumbent has a monopoly over small customers, we assume that large consumers are able 
to choose their retailer,4 have zero switching costs, and therefore face the price in the 
annual wholesale market, p.  These customers have a price-sensitive demand for electricity, 
which ensures that there is a downwards-sloping curve in the annual  
wholesale market.  For simplicity, we assume that the volume of electricity taken by small 
consumers is fixed and insensitive to price.  It will therefore not depend upon the method of 
regulation. 
If the incumbent is a monopoly incumbent, it will sell this fixed volume, V, to small 
consumers at a regulated price of s.  This price is set by yardstick competition – that is, it 
equals the average purchase cost of the other (regional) monopolies in the industry.  Each 
firm has the option of buying in the long-term contract market and paying the forward 
price, f, or waiting for the annual market and paying the current price, p.  We denote the 
average proportion of electricity bought in the annual market by a.  (We will allow the 
firms to buy more contracts than they will sell electricity, but cap a at a value of 0.)  This 
gives us: 
 
(8)  s = a p + (1 – a) f 
 
The retailer has bought x MWh of electricity through forward contracts, and buys the 
remaining (V – x) MWh on the short-term market.  We normalise all the firm’s other costs 
to zero, and so its profits are equal to: 
 
(9)  π = s V – p (V – x) –  f x 
 
If we insert the value of s, we obtain: 
                                                          
4 This is the minimum market opening now allowed by the European Union – small customers may remain 
“captive”, but a gradually increasing number of large customers must be allowed to choose their supplier. 
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(10)  π = [a p + (1 – a) f ]V – p (V – x) –  f x 
or 
(11)  π = (p – f) ( x – (1-a)V) 
  
If the variance of p is σ2, (which implies that A has a variance of 9σ2) then we obtain: 
 
(12)  var(π) = σ2 (x – (1-a)V)2    
 
We assume that the incumbent has a mean-variance utility over its profits, given by: 
 
(13)  U = (pe – f) (x – (1-a) V) – ½ λσ2 (x – (1-a) V)2 
 
Differentiating this equation with respect to x allows us to derive the firm’s demand for 
contracts: 
(14)  2)1( λσ
fpVax
e −+−=  
 
The retailer wants to cover the same proportion of its sales with contracts as the rest of the 
industry, since this minimises the variance of its profits, unless buying in the forward 
market is expected to be cheaper than spot purchasing.  If there are n identical retailers, the 
market inverse demand for contracts, in terms of the margin between the forward price and 
the expected spot price, is: 
 
(15) 
n
xxVapf ji
e
2
2 )()1( λσλσ +−−=−  
 
We can insert equation (15) and its derivative with respect to xi, –λσ2/n, into the generator’s 
reaction function (7): 
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(16)  
( ) ( )
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nbxVacA
x j
e
i /)918()4(
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2
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λσγγ
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+++
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We can solve for xi, bearing in mind that the generators’ contract sales will be symmetric in 
equilibrium.  For some parameter values, the retailers will not be fully hedged in the 
forward market, and a will be determined endogenously in the model.  This is because each 
of the retailers will end up buying the average proportion of its needs in the forward 
market, so that xi + xj = n(1 – a)V: 
 
(17)  ( ) nVxx
nb
cAx ji
e
i ≤+++−
−−= )(for
/)1(9)5(
)21(
2λσγγ
γ  
For other parameter values, however, this formula would imply that the retailers bought 
more than their physical requirements in the forward market.  We assume that they are 
allowed to do so, but that they are regulated as if they had exactly matched their physical 
requirements.  This means that we must replace (1-a)V in equations (11) to (15) with V, and 
this gives us a different equation for xi: 
 
(18)  ( ) ( ) nVxx
nb
VcAx ji
e
i >+++−
+−−= for
/)927()5(
9)21(
2
2
λσγγ
λσγ  
 
Equation (17) is easier to interpret than equation (18), although their implications are 
similar.  Forward sales are falling in the level of uncertainty and of risk aversion, and rising 
in the (absolute) value of the coefficient of variation.  Bertrand competition is represented 
by γ = –1, and this value of γ would give us contract sales of (Ae – c)/2b, if equation (17) 
held at the equilibrium.  That would be sufficient to drive the expected price down to 
marginal cost, even though we have a Cournot duopoly in the annual market, because the 
generators had covered all of their expected output in the forward market. 
 In practice, the retailers would have covered all of their sales to small consumers 
before the generators had covered all of their expected output, and so the equilibrium would 
be given by equation (18).  The forward price would be driven down to marginal cost, but 
the retailers would only be willing to hold contracts in excess of their sales to small 
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consumers if the forward price was below the expected annual price.  This would be the 
case, because the generators would not cover all of their expected output in the forward 
market, and so the annual price would exceed marginal cost.  
Generators are aware that if they reduce the volume of electricity sold forward, they 
can raise its price.  A conjectural variation of (minus) one means that neither generator 
expects to succeed in doing so – any reduction in its own sales will lead to an offsetting 
increase in the other generator’s sales.  Lower values of γ, however, give each generator an 
incentive to reduce its sales, and lead to higher prices.  
 
 
5. Retail competition 
Our second scenario has an unregulated incumbent which is free to choose its retail price, r, 
but is facing competition from other (entrant) retailers.  These retailers are assumed to offer 
power at the annual price, p, (since their other costs are normalised to zero).  Assuming that 
there will always be some entrants who can offer power at the spot price, it will not pay the 
other entrants to hedge by purchasing contracts at the expected spot price.  The entrant 
would make money if the spot price turns out to exceed the contract price, but would make 
a loss if the contract price exceeds the spot price, being forced to sell at the spot price in 
any event.   
We might assume that the incumbent would be forced by competition to set its own 
price equal to the annual price.  This would then guarantee that the incumbent would be 
exposed to risk if it hedged any of its purchases in the long-term market, but would do so 
by assumption.  A more realistic assumption, and one which might appear to leave the  
incumbent’s exposure to risk as an open question, is that the incumbent is protected by 
switching costs, and will keep much of its market, even if other retailers are undercutting it.  
We can represent this with a demand curve: 
 
(19)  q = V – h (r – p)  for r ≥  p 
   = V    for r < p 
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It will never be optimal for the incumbent to set a retail price below p, since this would 
imply selling below marginal cost!  The incumbent’s profits are given by: 
 
(20)  π = (V – h (r – p) ) (r – p) – x(f – p) 
 
Differentiating with respect to r, we get: 
 
(21)   
h
Vpr
2
+=   
Note that the profit-maximising retail price does not depend upon the contract price, or the 
volume of contracts signed by the incumbent, but only upon the spot price and the shape of 
the firm’s demand curve.5  The incumbent is willing to lose half of its sales in order to drive 
up the price – if this sounds extreme, note that incumbents in the UK lost around one-third 
of their small customers in the three years after they faced competition.  We then have: 
 
(22)  )(
4
2
pfx
h
V −−=π  
(23)  var(π) = σ2 x2    
and  
(24)  22
2
2
1)(
4
σλ xpfx
h
VU e −−−=  
Differentiating this equation with respect to x allows us to derive the firm’s demand for 
contracts: 
(25)  
2λσ
fpx
e −=  
 
                                                          
5 Note that we could increase the degree of competitive pressure faced by the incumbent by reducing 
switching costs and hence raising the value of h: in the limit, r will become arbitrarily close to p.  The results 
in this paper are independent of the value of h, except to the extent that a retailer protected by switching costs 
may be wealthier, and hence less risk-averse. 
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The retailer will only buy in the forward market if this is cheaper than the expected price in 
the annual market – any forward purchases raise the variance of the firm’s profits.   The 
overall inverse demand for contracts, in terms of the margin between the forward price and 
the expected spot price, is: 
 
(26)  
n
xxpf ji
e
2
)( λσ+−=−  
 
We can insert equation (26) and its derivative with respect to xi, –λσ2/n, into the generator’s 
reaction function (7): 
  
(27)  
( ) ( )
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e
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Solving, we get the equilibrium number of contracts sold: 
 
(28)  ( )
nb
cAx
e
i /)927()5(
)21(
2λσγγ
γ
++−
−−=  
 
In equilibrium, generators sell less electricity in the forward market if the retailers face 
competition than if the retailers are regulated monopolies.  The annual price is higher than 
with regulated monopolies.  The forward price is lower than the annual price,6  
however, and might be lower with retail competition than with regulated monopolies – that 
would be the case if 9λσ2/n > b.  (This result does not depend upon the value of γ.) 
 
 
6. Numerical Solutions 
We have presented a model in which the combination of risk aversion and retail 
competition leads to a lower degree of forward contracting in the electricity wholesale 
                                                          
6 This is in contrast to the more usual case when contracts do reduce retailers’ risk, and their risk aversion 
makes them willing to pay a premium, as modelled by, for example, Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002).  
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market, as Newbery predicted.  The aim of this paper, however, is to quantify that 
reduction, to show whether it is important.  To do that, we need to set values for our 
parameters. 
 We will chose values that are representative of the market in England and Wales in 
the early 1990s, when there was a dominant duopoly in generation, and twelve retailing 
incumbents (so n = 12).  We will set c = 20, representing a marginal cost of £20/MWh.  
The parameters for the inverse demand curve (or strictly speaking, the residual demand 
curve, for there was already a competitive fringe of smaller generators at this time) facing 
the generators are A = 50 and b = 2/3.  This means that in the absence of contracts, the 
generators would set a price of 30, and produce 15 units each (representing 15 GW), while 
their competitive output would be 22.5 units apiece.  With no risk aversion and conjectural 
variations of zero, each generator would sell 9 units in the forward market, raising its total 
output to 18, and the price of both forwards contracts and annual sales would be 26.  
Conjectural variations of minus one bring the forward and spot prices down to 20, in the 
absence of risk aversion.  Contracting thus leads to sizeable reductions in the wholesale 
prices. 
 We set V = 2.5, representing total sales to small consumers from our 12 incumbent 
monopolists of 30 GW.  We set h to 0.15, based on the fact that a 10% saving on the overall 
retail price (which is roughly £60/MWh) has been sufficient for the RECs to lose about 
one-third of their smaller customers (or 0.9 GW of sales, in this model).  Larger customers, 
who are in a competitive retail market and effectively buy at the annual price, make up the 
rest of the demand.  We will use two values for the variance of the annual price, σ2.  The 
variance of the annual average Pool Selling Price from 1990/1 to 2000/1 was 5.76, while 
the variance of the Oslo price for NordPool from 1993 to 2003 was 34.9 (measuring the 
prices in £/MWh).  This is in case the Pool had an atypically low volatility at an annual 
level, due to the high level of contracting and the interaction of market power and 
regulatory pressure.  The NordPool price is closely linked to the level of rainfall, given the 
importance of hydro-electric generation in the Nordic countries, and is therefore much 
more volatile from year to year.  (Nordic electricity retailers sell much of their power via 
tariffs that allow prices to change each month, passing through such volatility.) 
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The coefficient of risk aversion is hard to pin down, but crucial for the model.  We 
use evidence from the stock market, and Grinold’s (1996) “grapes from wine” technique, to 
suggest a plausible value.  An investor who has to split her wealth, W, between a portfolio 
of stocks, S (paying the market rate of return, m) and government bonds, (paying the risk-
free rate, r) would have the following utility:  
 
(29)  )(var½)( 2 mSmSrSWU λ−+−=  
 
Differentiating with respect to the amount of money held in stocks, we get: 
 
(30)  )(var mSrm
S
U λ−−=∂
∂  
 
Solving for λ, we get: 
 
(31)  
)(var mS
rm −=λ  
 
Using annual data for the UK from 1955 to 2000, the mean real return on the FT All-share 
index (the market rate) was 6.3% per annum, with a variance of 0.0256.  Taking the risk-
free real rate as 2½%, we obtain λ = 1.48/Stocks, or 2.23/Wealth, if the investor holds two-
thirds of her wealth in stocks. 
 What is the wealth of an electricity supplier?  In 1998/9, electricity suppliers in the 
UK were making operating profits of £437 million on sales of around 300 TWh, or about 
£1.50/MWh (CRI, 2000).  The present value of this would be about £12.50/MWh, 
discounting at a real rate of 12% (double the rate used in price control calculations, to 
reflect the greater risk in the supply business).  Each supplier is selling 2.5 GW in the 
period we model, giving a “wealth” of 31.25, measured in our units of £1000/GWh.  That 
gives λ = 0.071.  In practice, part of the accounting profit reported above might represent 
an economic cost.  The regulator allowed a profit margin of 1.5% of turnover when setting 
supply prices in 1998, or £0.90/MWh – if this is taken to reflect the economic cost that 
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should be deducted from accounting profits, we would have an economic profit of 
£0.60/MWh, “wealth” of 12.5, and λ = 0.178. 
 The figure shows how the parameters for risk aversion, the variance of demand and 
the conjectural variation interact to produce the realised wholesale price.  The figure gives 
the expected weighted average of the two wholesale prices (forward and annual), weighted 
by the share of electricity that the duopolists sell at each price.  The dotted lines are the 
average when there is actual competition, the solid lines the average with yardstick 
competition.  Both prices increase with the level of risk aversion and uncertainty, but it is 
the gap between them that is most relevant for us.  The two lines converge when there is 
either no risk aversion or no uncertainty, but rapidly diverge once both are present. 
 The lines are furthest apart when there is a high degree of risk aversion and 
uncertainty, and when the absolute value of the conjectural variation is high.  With Bertrand 
competition in the forward market, the price of long-term contracts will be £20/MWh.  
Regulated retailers will not only cover all of their needs in this market, but will actually 
over-contract.  The generators sell little at the spot price, itself depressed by the high level 
of contracting, and so their mean revenue per unit is close to £20/MWh.  Retailers facing 
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competition, however, buy many fewer contracts.  The generators sell more of their output 
at the spot price, and this in turn is higher.  With σ2 = 34.8, and λ = 0.178, the mean price is 
nearly 19% higher with retail competition.   
With the lower level of uncertainty, however, the generators’ revenues are only 3% 
higher with retail competition than with yardstick competition.  Similarly, a less 
competitive market for long-term contracts (in the sense of lower absolute values of the 
conjectural variation) gives much lower price increases if retail competition is introduced.  
A conjectural variation of –0.5 implies price increases of 3% and 7% for low and high 
uncertainty, while a conjectural variation of zero implies price increases of under 3%, 
whatever the degree of uncertainty.  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
The analysis in this paper has taken a deliberately simple model.  An electricity retailer 
facing competition will be limited in its ability to pass on the costs of long-term contracts, 
should the spot price fall below the price in those contracts.  This will reduce the optimal  
level of contracting for a risk-averse retailer, relative to a regulated incumbent that is 
allowed to pass on a yardstick measure of actual costs in the wholesale markets.  
Generators will enter the annual market with fewer forward sales when there is a 
competitive retail market.  The fewer long-term sales the generators have made, the more 
willing they are to raise the annual price.  With parameters reflecting the English electricity 
market of the 1990s, this might have raised wholesale electricity prices by about 3% on 
average.  This might be offset if retail competition brings benefits such as a greater variety 
of offerings (in terms of customer service and payment methods), or if it allows a reduction 
in regulation. 
 Retail competition has a stronger impact on prices when price volatility is high, and 
when the conjectural variation is close to minus one.  When the demand for contracts was 
strong, English generators were willing to cover most of their sales with long-term 
contracts, which is consistent with a conjectural variation near minus one.  If the price 
volatility in the English market has been atypically low, then parameter values representing 
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more normal conditions would imply that retail competition could raise wholesale prices by 
much more – up to 19%, with the level of volatility seen in the Norwegian market. 
 This paper has not modelled the dynamic impact of contracts – entry into the 
wholesale market is easier if retailers (or other parties) are willing to sign long-term 
contracts.  If reluctance to contract impedes entry, this could place further upwards pressure 
on prices.  The electricity market in England and Wales has changed significantly over the 
past five years, with retail competition, a trend towards vertical integration,7 and a new set 
of wholesale trading arrangements.  It may take time for companies to adjust to all of these 
changes, but once they have done so, we should study their contracting behaviour.  The 
model in this paper suggests that if prices are sufficiently volatile from year to year, the 
move to retail competition in the electricity industry could lead to a significant reduction in 
long-term contracting, and higher prices overall. 
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